Conference Record … , Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Principles of … , Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing … , Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Principles of … , Artikel 1—20 Mehr anzeigen. A guide to completeness and complexity for modal logics of knowledge and belief JY Halpern, Y Moses Artificial intelligence 54 3 , , This paper suggests the use of mediators in order to enrich the set of situati Abstract - Cited by 30 5 self - Add to MetaCart Providing agents with strategies that will be robust against de-viations by coalitions is central to the design of multi-agent agents.
This paper suggests the use of mediators in order to enrich the set of situations where we can obtain stability against deviations by coalitions. A mediator is a reliable entity, which can ask the agents for the right to play on their behalf, and is guaran-teed to behave in a pre-specified way based on messages received from the agents. Almost all proofs are missing from the extended abstract. This Version of the paper contains all of these missing proofs, and provides ad-ditional discussions and results.
Furthermore, some of the definitions that do appear in the extended abstract have been slightly modified. We prove some general results about mediators, and concentrate on the notion of strong mediated equilibrium; we show that desired behav-iors, which are stable against deviations by coalitions, can be obtained using mediators in several class of settings. Halpern , We consider games that have k, t -robust equilibria when played with a mediator, where an equilibrium is k, t -robust if it tolerates deviations by coalitions of size up to k and deviations by up to t players with unknown utilities.
We prove lower bounds that match upper bounds on the ability to i Abstract - Cited by 28 7 self - Add to MetaCart We consider games that have k, t -robust equilibria when played with a mediator, where an equilibrium is k, t -robust if it tolerates deviations by coalitions of size up to k and deviations by up to t players with unknown utilities.
We prove lower bounds that match upper bounds on the ability to implement such mediators using cheap talk that is, just allowing communication among the players. We propose a new methodology for rational secret sharing leading to various instantiations in both the two-party and multi-party settings that are simple and efficient in terms of computation, share size, and round complexity.
Our protocols do not require physical assumptions or simultaneous chann Abstract - Cited by 25 2 self - Add to MetaCart We propose a new methodology for rational secret sharing leading to various instantiations in both the two-party and multi-party settings that are simple and efficient in terms of computation, share size, and round complexity.
Our protocols do not require physical assumptions or simultaneous channels, and can even be run over asynchronous, point-to-point networks. We also propose new equilibrium notions namely, computational versions of strict Nash equilibrium and stability with respect to trembles and prove that our protocols satisfy them. These notions guarantee, roughly speaking, that at each point in the protocol there is a unique legal message a party can send.
This, in turn, ensures that protocol messages cannot be used as subliminal channels, something achieved in prior work only by making strong assumptions on the communication network. Powered by:. Abstract: We use ideas from distributed computing to study dynamic environments in which computational nodes, or decision makers, follow adaptive heuristics [16], i.
We explore when convergence of such simple dynamics to an equilibrium is guaranteed in asynchronous computational environments, where nodes can act at any time.
Our research agenda, distributed computing with adaptive heuristics, lies on the borderline of computer science including distributed computing and learning and game theory including game dynamics and adaptive heuristics. Urbano A. E, Computational complexity and communication: coordination in two-player games.
Econometrica 70 5 , Vieille N. Two-player stochastic games I: A reduction. Israel Journal of Mathematics , Two-player stochastic games II: The case of recursive games.
Extensive-form correlated equilibrium: definition and computational complexity. Mathematics of Operations Research 33 4 , Login Create Account Admin. Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information. There is a more recent version of this item available. All papers reproduced by permission. Reproduction and distribution subject to the approval of the copyright owners.
View Item. Yuval Heller.
0コメント